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RULEMAKING INACTION AND THE FAILURE
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO †
ABSTRACT
The Trump administration may be the first presidency to go four years
without promulgating new significant regulations to protect people and
the environment. Although administrative law protects regulatory
beneficiaries when agencies revoke or modify previous rules, those
protections evaporate when an agency rejects a rulemaking petition,
fails to answer a petition for years, or fails to work on pending
regulatory protections. In effect, the courts have outsourced agency
accountability for rulemaking inaction to political oversight, but as a
defense of the interests of regulatory beneficiaries, political
accountability is the “Maginot Line” of oversight. Despite the difficulty
of judging an agency’s claim that it has higher priorities or that it needs
more time to make a decision, judges should require more detailed
explanations. Although less trusting judicial review is not without its
problems, the current approach of abject deference to agency inaction
ignores Congress’ commitment to protect people and the environment
as specified in an agency’s mandate.
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INTRODUCTION
Presidents can pursue deregulation using three strategies: the
revocation of rules, the modification of them, or rulemaking inaction.
Inaction involves refusing to start any new rules to protect the public
or the environment or to delay regulatory rules already started to the
point of a crawl. While these steps do remove or modify existing rules,
they are still deregulatory. Inaction, despite the name, is deregulatory
because, as the Article will develop, Congress creates regulatory
agencies with the expectation that they will use their delegated
authority to protect people and the environment in the manner that
legislation indicates. When an administration engages in rulemaking
inaction, it fails this expectation, making its action deregulatory.
Moreover, the deregulatory impact is more than four (or eight) years
when you consider it will take a proregulatory administration years to
adopt a regulation after it takes office. Fans of the television show
Parks and Recreation will recognize this as the “Ron Swanson”
strategy.1
President Trump is unique among presidents in channeling Ron
Swanson. Other administrations have employed rulemaking inaction
as a deregulatory strategy. In the Reagan administration, for example,
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) issued
no new health standards for five years.2 It is probably not coincidental
that the two administrators of OSHA during that period were both
extremely hostile to the agency’s mission.3 But the Trump
1. Swanson, a fictional character from the situational comedy television series Parks and
Recreation, is the director of the parks and recreation department of a fictional city in Indiana
who, as a strong libertarian, supports the elimination of his department since public parks should
not even exist and, in the meantime, strategizes how to do nothing to advance the mandate of his
department. See WIKIPEDIA, Ron Swanson, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ron_Swanson
[https://perma.cc/ZXM8-WDRV].
2. THOMAS O. MCGARITY & SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, WORKERS AT RISK: THE FAILED
PROMISE OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION 61–63 (1993).
3. See id.
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administration is the first to employ this tactic on a government-wide
basis. President Trump’s executive order requiring agencies to
eliminate two rules for each new regulatory rule they promulgate has
stopped the entire government from adopting regulatory rules.4 In
2017, the regulatory agenda indicated that agencies took sixty-seven
deregulatory actions and only three regulatory actions.5 There is no
doubt that agencies in the Trump administration can defend their lack
of interest in new protective regulation as simply a matter of priority
setting—they are too busy deregulating—but the question remains
whether the courts should accept this claim as existing administrative
law appears to require them to do.
Among the three deregulatory strategies, administrative law
provides the weakest check—an almost nonexistent check in fact—on
rulemaking inaction as a strategy of deregulation as compared to
revocation and modification. Although scholars have noted the impact
of rulemaking inaction on protection of the public and the
environment, they have been reluctant to support changing the existing
approach to judicial review because of the judiciary’s difficulty in
judging agency priorities.6
This Article challenges the current judicial calculus that elevates
the significance of agency priority setting while giving little or no
weight to the significance of legislative commitments to protect people
and the environment. My starting point is the recognition that
rulemaking inaction can, and sometimes is, a deregulation game,
exploiting administrative law for ideological motivations. If
administrative law is to ensure that administrative decisions are a
matter of law, and not simply ideology, courts must raise their
4. See Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (2017).
5. Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., Trump’s 2018 Regulatory Reform Agenda By the Numbers,
FORBES (May 10, 2018, 1:21 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/waynecrews/2018/05/10/trumps2018-regulatory-reform-agenda-by-the-numbers/#53a5fc97cd29 [https://perma.cc/4QSX-ASL3].
The Executive Order only applies to significant regulations, but some significant regulations are
exempt from the order. See Cheryl Bolen, Trump’s 2-for-1 Regulatory Policy Yields Minimal
Results, BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 29, 2017), https://www.bna.com/trumps-2for1-regulatoryn73014470324/ [https://perma.cc/GA7T-X6WL].
6. See, e.g., Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays: How a Principal-Agent Approach
Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1381, 1427–31 (2011); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Law of “Not Now”: When
Agencies Defer Decisions, 103 GEO. L.J. 157, 161, 172–76 (2014) (discussing the Supreme Court’s
recognition of agency discretion in priority setting in Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)); see
generally, e.g., Eric Biber, Two Sides of the Same Coin: Judicial Review of Administrative Agency
Action and Inaction, 26 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 461 (2008) (arguing that courts should defer to agencies
in resource allocation among competing priorities).
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expectations about what constitutes a satisfactory justification for
putting protective regulations at the back of a queue. A lack of
curiosity is a failure of administrative law, not an implementation of it.
My analysis begins with the deregulation game. In analyzing the
strategic choices available to agencies from a positive political
perspective, the choice of rulemaking inaction, despite the opposition
of regulatory beneficiaries, is the strategy the courts are most likely to
accept. Moreover, if Congress is aligned with the president, the strategy
is likely to be supported by both it and regulated entities.
Administrative law also aids and abets this strategic choice.
Because the revocation of rules must overcome the rulemaking record
established by the adopting agency, the revoking agency must persuade
a court that there is no need for a rule—some rule—which is likely to
be difficult. Rather, an agency is better off modifying a rule because
judges recognize that an agency has more than one nonarbitrary policy
option. Nonetheless, judicial review still has some bite because the
modifying agency must choose among those reasonable options. The
courts are most likely to accept rulemaking inaction because judges use
abject deference to review such actions, and because petitioners do not
have a record on which they contest agency claims about rulemaking
priorities.
The last Part contends the current judicial approach to rulemaking
inaction fails to fulfill the function of administrative law as “legal
civics”—requiring an agency to offer reasons that justify its action as
implementing its statutory mandate. Specifically, judicial review of
agency action, as currently practiced, is so deferential that it effectively
ignores Congress’ commitment to protect people and the environment
as specified in an agency’s mandate. That mandate is not neutral
between action and inaction. It is not ambivalent between regulation
and the lack of regulation. Instead, the role of the courts is therefore to
establish both a ceiling and a floor that cabins the policy space in which
an agency can operate. Just as an agency cannot exceed the legal
authority delegated by Congress, it also cannot avoid its statutory
obligation to protect the public.
The courts today only enforce the ceiling. It is time—past time,
really—that judges enforce the floor as well. If administrative law is to
require that agencies operate in a legal manner—that is, within the
bounds of their statutory mandate—courts must stop giving agencies
carte blanche concerning rulemaking inaction. Otherwise,
administrative law will continue to fail to recognize rulemaking
inaction as an illegitimate and undemocratic act.
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I. THE DEREGULATION GAME
In analyzing the strategic choices available to political actors,
analysts have employed a game theoretic model that identifies likely
outcomes based on structural factors that shape political behavior, such
as constitutional or legal rules.7 When you model an administration’s
options to engage in deregulation as a set of strategic choices, it
illustrates that rulemaking inaction is likely to be the most successful
of the three deregulatory strategies. Although this choice does not
eliminate regulation, it nevertheless is deregulatory because it can
postpone any new protective regulations for years, even if a president
is not elected for a second term. It has this impact because under
existing structural factors, particularly agency resources and judicial
expectations, it takes anywhere from four to eight years or more to
promulgate a significant rule in any administration that follows the
administration committed to inaction.8
A president with a deregulation agenda can direct agencies to
revoke rules, modify them, or choose not to promulgate new regulatory
rules. The following diagrams model the strategic preferences of

7. See generally, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER,
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW (1994) (using game theory to illustrate the different kinds of legal
problems); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J.
523 (1992) (applying game theory to analyzing Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution); Jerry L.
Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on Management, Games,
and Accountability, 57 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (1994) (applying game theory to analyzing
OSHA and EPA rulemaking); Eric R. Claeys, Note, The Article III, Section 2 Games: A GameTheoretic Account of Standing and Other Justiciability Doctrines, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1321 (1994)
(applying game theory to analyzing justiciability doctrines).
8. For an explanation of why a rule takes a minimum of between 47 and 95 months to
promulgate, see Regulatory Accountability Act of 2011: Hearing on H.R. 3010 Before the Judiciary
Comm., 112th Cong. 6 (2011) (testimony of Sidney A. Shapiro, University Distinguished Chair in
Law, Wake Forest School of Law), http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/Shaprio_RAA_
Tesimony_102511.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XUZ-AGUM]. For a general discussion of the
ossification of rulemaking, see JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR
AUTO SAFETY 9–25 (1990) (discussing abandonment of rulemaking by the NHTSA); Frank B.
Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of Administrative Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. REV.
1013, 1020–27 (2000); Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking
Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1387–1436 (1992). Some scholars have disputed that the rulemaking
delay is a serious problem. See, e.g., Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the
Ossification Thesis: An Empirical Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–
1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414, 1421 (2012). But this empirical work fails to account for the
fact that controversial, significant rules take years, while other noncontroversial, minor rules take
much less time. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Rulemaking Ossification Is Real: A Response to Testing
the Ossification Thesis, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1493, 1497–98 (2012); Sidney A. Shapiro &
Richard W. Murphy, Arbitrariness Review Made Reasonable: Structural and Conceptual Reform
of the “Hard Look,” 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 331, 354 (2016).
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regulatory beneficiaries (B), Congress (C), regulated entities (E), and
the president (P). The likelihood that judges (J) will affirm the
president’s preferred policy is found above the line in the diagrams.
The distance between the actors, as pictured, is inexact, and the
illustrations are meant to indicate a comparative or relative ordering.
In Figure 1, the president (P) and regulated entities (E) are pictured as
preferring revocation as a deregulatory strategy. Congress (C) is
likewise supportive, but regulatory beneficiaries (B) have a strong
preference against revocation. The courts (J) are depicted in Figure 1
as being resistant to the revocation of rules, although not as much so as
regulatory beneficiaries (B).
In Figure 1, there is a significant gap between the president’s
policy preference to revoke existing regulations and the likelihood the
courts will affirm a revocation. To be sure, the outcome of judicial
review can vary depending on the ideological preferences of the judge,9
but a judge is less likely to act strategically when an administration has
clearly or obviously violated legal doctrines or its statutory mandate.10
The judge’s behavior is therefore bounded because at some point an
agency’s deregulatory decisions are likely to be clear violations of
existing case law as explained in Part II.A.
Figure 1: Revoke
J
Preference
Against
B

Preference
For
C

P

E

Figure 1 assumes the administration and regulated entities have
similar preferences for revoking a rule, but those conditions will not
always hold. For example, regulated entities may not have a strong
preference for the revocation of rules because, having already come
into compliance with rule, a significant portion of the cost of
compliance is a sunk cost for them. Then again, a president might have
a weaker preference for the revocation of rules than regulated entities

9. See Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory Policy? An
Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 832 (2006); Thomas J. Miles & Cass
R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 788–89 (2008).
10. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Politicized Judicial Review in Administrative
Law: Three Improbable Responses, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 319, 334–36 (2012); Sidney A.
Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of
Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1056–57 (1995).
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because of political pressure, such as legislative opposition if there is
divided government. The political environment shifted for President
Reagan, for example, when Ann Gorsuch—his first administrator of
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)—was forced to resign
after being caught up in political scandal.11 The president was forced to
appoint William Ruckelshaus, a former EPA administrator, who was
committed to restoring EPA’s credibility and effectiveness.12
In Figure 2, the position of the courts (J) and the president (P) are
closer than in Figure 1 because it is more likely that judges will affirm
the modification of a rule than it is they will accept its revocation, as
Part II.B explains. Once again, the relative policy preferences of the
other players can differ from those that are modeled in Figure 2.
Regulatory beneficiaries, for example, may not be as opposed to the
modification as Figure 2 indicates if the modification does not
significantly reduce the protection available to them. Or the policy
preference of regulated entities (E) may not be similar to that of the
president because once again the costs of complying with the original
rule may be largely sunk costs. Depending on its political makeup,
Congress (C) might have a policy preference that is closer or more
remote from the preferences of the president and regulated entities.
Despite these and other permutations, the important point is that the
case law is relatively favorable to the modification of a rule, and it is
more so for the revocation of a rule. By comparison, as we come to
next, legal doctrine is even more favorable, as a general matter, to
rulemaking inaction.
Figure 2: Modify
Preference
Against

B

J
Preference
For
C

P

E

An agency’s decision not to adopt new protective regulations is
likely to be a winning strategy in terms of judicial review, as Part II.C
explains. Like the previous diagrams, Figure 3 captures common
strategic preferences of the agency and interested parties, but these can
shift in a number of circumstances. For example, judicial patience for
11. JONATHAN LASH, KATHERINE GILLMAN & DAVID SHERIDAN, A SEASON OF SPOILS:
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION’S ATTACK ON THE ENVIRONMENT 81 (1st ed. 1984).
12. Daniel J. Fiorino, Streams of Environmental Innovation: Four Decades of EPA Policy
Reform, 44 ENVTL. L. 723, 740 (2014).
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the failure to respond to a petition may not be as generous if the
petition was filed in a previous administration, and a significant amount
of time has elapsed prior to a new administration taking control of an
agency.13 Or an agency may decide to grant the petition and adopt a
rule that is less stringent than a more zealous administration might
adopt, as a tactic to raise the costs of replacing its rule in the new
administration. All in all, none of the permutations belie the conclusion
that judicial review is highly favorable to an administration that favors
rulemaking inaction as a deregulatory strategy.
J

Figure 3: Inaction
Preference
Against

B

C

P

E

Preference
For

II. THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF DEREGULATION
The previous description of an administration’s strategic choices
identifies differences in the prospect of judicial acceptance of rule
revocation, modification, and inaction. Put simply, the courts are the
least likely to affirm the revocation of a rule and the most likely to
accept rulemaking inaction. This claim is made with recognition that
for many lawyers and scholars, such as Professors Gellhorn and
Robinson some forty years ago, “the rules governing judicial review
have no more substance at the core than a seedless grape.”14 Fair
enough, but as Professor Schotland suggested, the scope of review at
least establishes a “mood point[]” that forms the critical attitude with
which a judge approaches an administrative decision.15 The law of
inaction invites differing moods when it comes to revocation,
modification, and inaction.
An administration can engage in inaction either by failing to start
any new proregulatory rulemakings or by stalling proregulatory rules
that it inherited. When an agency has failed to start new rules,
regulatory beneficiaries cannot sue the agency for its inaction. The
Supreme Court has instead held that their only remedy is to file a
rulemaking petition and then seek judicial review if an agency rejects
13. See infra Parts III.C.3–4 (arguing that judges should apply more rigorous review to
rulemaking inaction).
14. Ernest Gellhorn & Glen O. Robinson, Perspectives on Administrative Law, 75 COLUM.
L. REV. 771, 780 (1975).
15. Roy A. Schotland, Scope of Review of Administrative Action, 34 FED. B.J. 54, 59 (1975).
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the petition or fails to respond in a timely manner. If an agency is slow
walking a rule, regulatory beneficiaries can sue the agency over the
delay.
A. Revocation
The mood when judges review the revocation of a rule is
skepticism. As Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.16 established years ago, courts are to employ hard
look review, which requires judges to determine if the rulemaking
record supports the determination that a rule is not necessary to
address the risk or problem established by an agency when it
promulgated the rule in the first place.17 Unless the original agency was
mistaken, or somehow circumstances have changed, it will be difficult
for the revoking agency to overcome the previous rulemaking record.
In State Farm, the Justices were unanimous that the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) had failed to
explain its decision to drop the requirement that automobile
manufacturers install air bags in cars. In fact, the NHTSA had not
offered any explanation whatsoever.18 But a majority of the Court also
found that the agency had failed to adequately explain revoking the
requirement automobile manufacturers install automatic seatbelts
because there was a discrepancy between this choice and some of the
evidence buried in the rulemaking record.19 Whether or not a reviewing
court will likewise scour the rulemaking record in other revocation
cases, it is clear that the revoking agency must overcome the findings
in the original rulemaking record that a rule—some rule—is necessary
to protect the public, according to the agency’s mandate.
Assuming that the agency originally had reliable evidence
establishing that the rule addressed a risk to the public or some other
need for regulatory protection, it will be necessary for the same agency
to show that this finding was in error. Perhaps the agency earlier made
a hash of its findings in this regard, but this seems unlikely if, as most
often happens, the rule was affirmed on appeal after a court of appeals
16. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
17. Id. at 29, 42–44 (1983) (establishing that a judge must verify that an agency “examine[d]
the relevant data and articulate[d] a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc.
v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962))).
18. Id. at 46 (“NHTSA apparently gave no consideration whatever to modifying the
Standard to require that airbag technology be utilized.”).
19. Id. at 54.

SHAPIRO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1814

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/25/2019 3:54 PM

[Vol. 68:1805

applied hard look review to affirm the agency’s claim that the rule was
necessary to prevent some risk or harm.
Alternatively, when the agency revokes the rule, it may claim that
the previous agency regime lacked the legal authority to promulgate its
rule. Again, since the original rule is in effect, it likely survived judicial
review and a challenge to its legal authority to promulgate the rule if
one was available to the plaintiff.
Still, if the agency’s original rule prevailed at step two of Chevron,
when it revokes the rule, the agency presumably could argue that its
claim of lack of jurisdiction is also a plausible reading of its statutory
authority.20 Assume, for example, that a court had affirmed the Clean
Power Plant Rule promulgated in the Obama administration. The rule
was based on a contested interpretation of EPA’s authority under the
Clean Air Act.21 Arguably, a later administration could revoke the rule
by reading the same statutory language as not empowering it to issue
such a rule. The Supreme Court has held that a prior agency
interpretation of a judicial ruling on the meaning of a provision is
prohibited only if the prior court decision holds that its construction
follows the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus makes no room
for agency discretion.22 It is not clear how often this situation arises, but
when it does, the revoking agency may be more successful in court than
if its revocation is based on a claim that no risk or problem exists.
B. Modification
The mood when judges review the modification of a rule is more
accommodating. As agencies can choose more than one regulatory
policy that is not “arbitrary” and “capricious,”23 judges have the
expectation that an agency can modify a rule by making a different set
of calculations concerning which of several policy options it prefers. In
other words, although judges apply hard look review to rulemaking
modifications, judges expect that an agency can justify the withdrawal
of a rule because the agency is not trying to overcome an earlier
20. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 863–64 (1984) (“An initial agency
interpretation is not instantly carved in stone . . . . [T]he agency . . . must consider varying
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”).
21. See Jody Freeman & David B. Spence, Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV.
1, 41–42 (2014).
22. Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005);
Maislin Indus., U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 131 (1990); see also United States v.
Home Concrete & Supply, 566 U.S. 478, 486 (2012).
23. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a) (2012).
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rulemaking record that establishes some type of regulation is
necessary.
In FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,24 for example, the Court
reviewed a decision by the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”) concerning when a broadcaster violated a ban on “indecent
broadcasts.”25 After Congress prohibited “indecent” broadcasts,26 the
FCC adopted a policy that it would not hold broadcasters liable for
“fleeting expletives.”27 Then, the FCC decided that, although it would
not impose sanctions on the broadcasters, it would no longer allow a
fleeting-expletive safe harbor.28 A majority of five Justices affirmed the
new policy in a decision in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, who
declared policy changes should not be subject to stricter review than
the usual demand of a reasoned explanation.29 As he wrote, the agency
need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons for the
new policy are better than the reasons for the old one; it suffices that
the new policy is permissible under the statute, that there are good
reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better, which the
conscious change of course adequately indicates.30

Although Justice Kennedy voted to affirm the new policy, he
joined the dissenting Justices in requiring an explanation why the
agency chose to reject the first policy in favor of the second.31 So, five
members of the Court decided that an agency must not only justify the
new rule, but also must justify the change in rules.
Even if this expectation does not survive in light of the new
makeup of the Court,32 agencies should normally be able to meet this

24. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009).
25. Id. at 505–07.
26. See Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-356, § 16(a), 106 Stat. 949,
954 (1992) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 303 (2010)) (instructing the FCC to enforce a
statutory ban on indecent broadcasts).
27. See Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. at 508, 512 (explaining the evolution of agency
policy).
28. Id. at 512–13.
29. Id. at 514.
30. Id. at 515 (emphasis in original).
31. Id. at 547 (Breyer, J., dissenting); id. at 535 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that an
agency making a policy change “must explain why ‘it now reject[s] the considerations that led it
to adopt that initial policy’” (quoting id. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
32. In Encino Motorcars v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117 (2016), the Court remanded a policy
change by an agency because it failed to offer an adequate explanation for its new policy. Id. at
2126. Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy neither cited Fox Television Stations nor did he
mention that an agency must justify its later policy as better than the earlier one. See id. at 2125–

SHAPIRO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1816

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

4/25/2019 3:54 PM

[Vol. 68:1805

expectation. A later agency can reasonably disagree with the original
choice, and, if so, it should be able to explain its difference of opinion
when it justifies a modified rule. After all, the agency has reasons for
preferring the new rule, and there is no reason to think agency lawyers
cannot explain those reasons.
C. Inaction
A judge’s mood when reviewing agency inaction is that agency
priority setting is above his or her pay grade. As a result, when
compared to the revocation or modification of a rule, an agency can
expect the courts will almost always permit inaction. As regulatory
beneficiaries cannot sue agencies for inaction unless there is a
mandatory duty to promulgate a regulation, which Congress seldom
imposes, the only way to attack inaction is to petition an agency to
promulgate a rule. A court, however, will apply extremely deferential
review if an agency rejects a rulemaking petition out of respect for the
agency’s need for priority setting. Alternatively, if an agency has not
responded to a rulemaking petition, or if it has been slow in developing
a rule, judges normally are unwilling to order the agency to take
immediate action because of the difficulty in determining whether an
agency has been acting in good faith. Intervention is therefore
warranted only in cases where it is strikingly obvious that the refusal to
work on a rule or start one cannot be justified as a matter of allowable
administrative choice.
1. Rulemaking Petitions. After the Supreme Court’s decision in
Norton v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance,33 a plaintiff cannot sue an
agency for inaction without first filing a petition requesting that action.
In Norton, the plaintiff had sued the Department of Interior (“DOI”)
for its failure to ban the use of off-road-vehicles (“ORV”) in wilderness
study areas. The question before the Court was whether the judge
could compel the DOI to act under its legislative mandate to protect
such areas. In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court’s answer was a
resounding “no.”
The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) is at the center of the
Norton decision. It creates a cause of action to sue an agency for

26 (describing the applicable legal doctrine). Since, however, the agency did not offer an adequate
justification for its later rule, there was no necessity to discuss an agency’s obligation to defend
the later rule as better than the earlier one.
33. Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55 (2004).
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persons “adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
meaning of a relevant statute,”34 empowering regulatory beneficiaries
to sue an agency to test the legality of the agency’s action. Although
this suggests that a plaintiff can only sue if an agency does something
(“aggrieved by agency action”), the APA oxymoronically defines
“agency action” as including the “failure to act.”35 The plaintiff in
Norton claimed the agency’s mandate required it to protect wilderness
study areas from environmental deterioration, and environmentalists
asserted the “use of ORVs on federal land has negative environmental
consequences, including soil disruption and compaction, harassment of
animals, and annoyance of wilderness lovers.”36 In Norton, the plaintiff
therefore asked the Court to order the DOI to ban ORVs under the
Court’s authority in the APA to “compel agency action unlawfully
withheld.”37
The Court asserted that the agency’s failure to ban the vehicles
was not “unlawfully withheld” because the agency did not have a
mandatory duty to take this step. Although the Court agreed that the
agency had been required by Congress to protect wilderness study
areas, it found Congress had left it up to the agency to determine what
steps were necessary to accomplish this goal.38 This interpretation was
necessary, Justice Scalia explained, because when Congress adopted
the APA, it intended to continue the traditional mandamus remedy as
it existed prior to the APA.39 Under traditional mandamus, a court is
only authorized to order a government official to take a specific action
if Congress has mandated that action. Put simply, the Norton plaintiffs
were asking the Court to do something it could not do.

34. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2012). To meet this burden, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the interest
it seeks to protect is “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected . . . by the statute . . . in
question.” Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see also MatchE-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567 U.S. 209, 225 (2012) (finding
that a plaintiff was within the “zone of interest” because the plaintiff’s interests were not “so
marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot
reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit” (quoting Clarke v. Sec. Indus.
Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987)); Air Courier Conference of Am. v. Am. Postal Workers Union,
498 U.S. 517, 524–28 (1991) (inquiring into the context of a statutory provision and its legislative
history to determine that the plaintiff was not in the zone of interests).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 551(13).
36. Norton, 542 U.S. at 60, 66.
37. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1).
38. See Norton, 542 U.S. at 66.
39. See id. at 63.
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What all of this means is a plaintiff is not entitled to relief unless
an agency has a legal obligation to adopt a rule, which would be true
only in two instances. First, if Congress has required an agency to
promulgate a rule, which sometimes happens,40 a plaintiff can get relief
if the agency has failed to do so. And second, the other possibility arises
after the agency has denied a rulemaking petition. If the denial is not
legally justified, a court can compel the agency to start a rulemaking
process.41 But the courts apply a form of very deferential review when
ruling on the legality of an agency’s decision to deny a rulemaking
petition.
2. Denial. An agency is likely to prevail when there is a judicial
challenge to its denial of a rulemaking petition because judicial review
is “‘extremely limited’” and “‘highly deferential.’”42 As a typical
statement of the scope of review indicates, “[a]s a general proposition,
this court will compel an agency to institute rulemaking proceedings
only in extremely rare instances.”43 Let’s call this “soft look” review.44
Because review is a “soft look,” a court’s mood is to accept, at face
value, a plausible explanation why an agency denied a rulemaking
petition. A court will normally affirm the denial if, in a rulemaking
petition, the agency claims it has limited resources and other
priorities,45 a rule is unnecessary to address a regulatory problem,46 it
lacks the scientific information to formulate a law,47 or that there is no
significant regulatory problem to be addressed.48
40. See, e.g., Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 7615b(d) (requiring EPA to
“promulgate, not later than 18 months after November 15, 1990, a system for issuing, recording,
and tracking [the] allowances [that authorize emissions of acid rain precursors], which shall
specify all necessary procedures and requirements for an orderly and competitive functioning of
the allowance system”).
41. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007) (holding that the Clean Air Act
permits review of EPA’s rejection of a rulemaking petition).
42. Id. at 527–28 (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers & Forwarders Ass’n of Am. v. United
States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
43. Ark. Power & Light Co. v. ICC, 725 F.2d 716, 723 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
44. Cf. Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE
L.J. 1032, 1055 (2011) (noting that “‘hard look’ review can become ‘soft look’ review or even a
rubber stamp for agency decisionmaking”).
45. See, e.g., Wildearth Guardians v. EPA, 751 F.3d 649, 651 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Defs. of
Wildlife v. Gutierrez, 532 F.3d 913, 921 (D.C. Cir. 2008); UAW v. Chao, 361 F.3d 249, 255–56 (3d
Cir. 2004).
46. See, e.g., Compassion Over Killing v. FDA, 849 F.3d 849, 857 (9th Cir. 2017).
47. In re Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 830 F.2d 369, 372 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
48. See, e.g., Compassion Over Killing, 849 F.3d at 857 (finding that the FDA had broad
discretion to enforce on a case-by-case basis rather than promulgating regulations where the
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Under soft look review, “[f]ederal courts rarely conduct
meaningful judicial review of agency inaction.”49 Two reasons explain
the credulous nature of judicial review. First, lacking a rulemaking
record, it is difficult for a plaintiff to contest the agency explanation.
Since “hard look” review requires a judge to assess the agency’s
justification in light of the rulemaking record, looking for discrepancies
or oversights,50 soft look review reflects the lack of a record to conduct
hard look review. The record before a court consists of the plaintiff’s
rulemaking petition and the agency’s letter or notice denying the
petition, which gives a plaintiff only a limited opportunity to point to
facts that overcome the agency’s claims.51
Second, soft look review of rulemaking petitions reflects judicial
attitudes about agency priority setting and the interests of regulatory
beneficiaries. Because a rulemaking petition effectively attempts to
trump agency priority setting, judges have been sympathetic to an
administration’s prerogative—having won the election—to determine
how to use agency resources. More broadly, since the agency is doing
nothing, it is a matter of “no harm, no foul.” That regulatory
beneficiaries have a type of legal right to be protected simply does not
enter the judicial equation.
To be sure, however, agencies are not given carte blanche
authority to reject a rulemaking petition. Thus, the courts will overrule
the denial of a rulemaking petition when an agency erroneously claims
it lacks the legal authority to start the requested rulemaking.52
Likewise, the agency is likely to lose the case if its explanation is not
facially credible in light of the claims in the rulemaking petition.53

agency decided to prioritize other projects); Serv. Women’s Action Network v. Sec’y of Veterans
Affairs, 815 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Preminger v. Sec’y of Veterans Aff., 632 F.3d 1345,
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
49. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1381 (2013).
50. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
51. The situation changes, however, when an agency declines to issue a rule after it completes
the rulemaking record. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Res. Grp. v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1159
(D.C. Cir. 1983). As the court explained in Williams Natural Gas Co. v. FERC, there is a
difference “between an agency’s refusal to undertake a rulemaking (reviewable, if at all, under
an exceedingly narrow standard), and its decision to terminate a docket after a substantial record
has been compiled.” 872 F.2d 438, 443 (D.C. Cir. 1989). At the end of the rulemaking process, the
court noted, it had “a sufficient evidentiary basis for determining whether the Commission’s
ultimate decision was arbitrary and capricious or in contravention of the statute.” Id.
52. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
53. See, e.g., Flyers Rights Educ. Fund v. FAA, 864 F.3d 738, 744–45 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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Finally, according to Massachusetts v. EPA,54 an agency cannot justify
its denial based on reasons unrelated to its statutory mission.55 The last
limitation is discussed in more detail in Part III.A.
All things considered, administrative law is more favorable to an
agency’s decision to deny a rulemaking petition than it is to judicial
review of a rulemaking modification or withdrawal. While review is not
toothless, it is not searching, either. An agency might trip over its own
feet in justifying the denial of a rulemaking petition, but agencies
should be able to avoid this outcome in most cases by careful legal and
policy work. If not, why make dubious argument when an agency can
go years without answering it as the next Section indicates?
3. No Response. An agency has an obligation under the APA to
respond to a rulemaking petition within a “reasonable” amount of
time,56 and this requirement is judicially enforceable.57 What is
reasonable is not defined, and most courts use the multi-factor analysis
established in Telecommunications Research & Action Center v. FCC58
(“TRAC”) to assess “whether the agency’s delay is so egregious as to
warrant mandamus.”59 But the factors are not particularly helpful in
determining the reasonableness of a delay because their comparative
importance has never been established; moreover, it is unclear how
many of the factors are necessary to find a delay has been

54. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
55. See id. at 533.
56. 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (2012) (establishing an agency’s duty “within a reasonable time . . . to
conclude a matter presented to it” (emphasis added)).
57. Section 706(1) of the APA authorizes a court to “compel agency action unlawfully
withheld or unreasonably delayed.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (emphasis added). Section 551(13) defines
“agency action” to include “failure to act.” 5 U.S.C. § 551(13).
58. Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
59. Id. at 79. The TRAC case developed the factors as a summation of considerations that
had been used in other cases to determine whether a delay was unreasonable within the meaning
of the APA. According to this summary:
(1) the time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a “rule of reason”;
(2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other indication of the speed with
which it expects the agency to proceed in the enabling statute, that statutory scheme
may supply content for this rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the
sphere of economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare are at
stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting delayed action on agency
activities of a higher or competing priority; (5) the court should also take into account
the nature and extent of the interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not
“find any impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that agency
action is ‘unreasonably delayed.’”
Id. at 80 (citations omitted) (quoting Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 34
(D.C. Cir. 1983)).
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unreasonable.60 Furthermore, although one of the factors is whether
Congress has established a deadline to respond to a petition,61 the
courts are split whether the deadline is mandatory or precatory.62 At
the end of the day, judges “can use the TRAC analysis to support
virtually any conclusion they want to reach.”63
Using this test, judges are inclined to accept an agency’s excuse
that “it is too busy,” at least until enough years pass that this excuse no
longer appears credible.64 Judges are in an accommodating mood
because they are in no position to assess the relative priorities of all the
things the agency does. Perhaps the agency’s explanation is in good
faith and perhaps it is not. Although an agency may be acting
strategically when it makes this claim, it is also possible that the claims
are in good faith. If, for example, a petition asks EPA to promulgate a
rule under the Clean Air Act to reduce ambient exposure to a chemical
because it is pollutant, the agency must investigate the scientific and
other evidence needed to make this complex determination. And then
it must determine whether the risk to the people and the environment
is greater than from other pollutants that the agency is currently
regulating or may regulate in the future. All of this must be done while
the agency balances its other commitments and accounts for the
resources available to it in these days of shrinking agency budgets.65
60. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 6, at 1412.
61. Id. at 1411.
62. Compare In re United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 551 (D.C. Cir.
1999) (“Our conclusion that the Secretary has violated the deadline set forth in the Mine Act does
not end the analysis. . . . [W]e must continue our analysis of the remaining TRAC factors to
determine whether mandamus is appropriate in this case.”), with Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174
F.3d 1178, 1190–91 (10th Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen an entity governed by the APA fails to comply with
a statutorily imposed absolute deadline, it has unlawfully withheld agency action and courts, upon
proper application, must compel the agency to act.”).
63. Sant’Ambrogio, supra note 6, at 1413.
64. See, e.g., In re Core Commc’ns, Inc., 531 F.3d 849, 857 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (finding that a
six-year delay in issuing a justification for a rule after the rule was remanded without vacation was
unreasonable); In re Am. Rivers & Idaho Rivers United, 372 F.3d 413, 419–20 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(identifying that a failure to respond to rulemaking petition in six-plus years is unreasonable); In
re United Mine Workers, 190 F.3d at 551–54 (noting that the court ordered an agency to produce
timetable for promulgating final rule after an eight-year delay); Forest Guardians, 174 F.3d at
1193 (finding a four-year delay in promulgating a rule to be unreasonable in light of one-year
statutory deadline for promulgation); Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Brock, 823 F.2d 626,
629 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that a five-year delay in promulgating a final rule “treads at the very
lip of the abyss of unreasonable delay”).
65. See RENA STEINZOR & SIDNEY SHAPIRO, THE PEOPLE’S AGENTS AND THE BATTLE TO
PROTECT THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: SPECIAL INTERESTS, GOVERNMENT, AND THREATS TO
HEALTH, SAFETY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 65–67 (2010) (documenting budget cuts at health
and safety agencies).
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Thus, in an APA irony, an agency can “respond to a petition for
rulemaking designed to remedy indefinite agency delay with more
indefinite agency delay.”66 For any agency with a deregulatory agenda,
current doctrine offers an opportunity to delay a response for much of
an entire administration, if not the whole four years. Even when a court
begins to doubt that the agency’s justification is valid, it will
nonetheless ask the agency to develop a schedule for responding,
rather than order it to do so, a result that buys the agency even more
time.67 Though this remedy eventually forces an agency to cough up a
response, it also offers the agency more time to delay as part of a
deregulatory strategy.
4. A Slow Walk. Agencies in a new presidential administration
will inherit some rules that were started by their predecessors. An
agency committed to deregulation has two options for existing rules in
the pipeline. It can withdraw them from the rulemaking, but as
indicated previously, this strategy may not be successful if the agency
has already developed a rulemaking record. Or it can slow down the
development of existing regulatory rules to the average speed of an
tortoise,68 which pretty much guarantees that nothing will happen for
several years.69
Courts will evaluate claims of unreasonable delay in the
completion of a rule in light of the extent of the delay, the nature of the
agency’s statutory mandate, the consequences of the delay, and the
validity of the agency’s reasons why it is taking so long.70 Once again,
the vagueness of these factors and the failure to decide the significance
of each factor as compared to the others allows judges to accept even
long delays if they are so inclined. And they are. Judges have the same
reluctance to interfere with how an agency balances its priorities and
resources concerning the development of existing rules as they do

66. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard Murphy, Constraining White House Political Control of
Agency Rulemaking Through the Duty of Reasoned Explanation, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1457,
1487 (2015).
67. See Nat’l Cong. of Hispanic Am. Citizens (El Congreso) v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 882, 891
(D.C. Cir. 1979); cf. Nat’l Res. Def. Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (stating
that “[t]he courts cannot responsibly mandate flat guideline deadlines when the Administrator
demonstrates that additional time is necessary” to ensure compliance with the statute).
68. Jacob Reis, How Fast Does A Turtle Run?, CUTENESS, https://www.cuteness.com/article/
how-fast-does-turtle-run [https://perma.cc/R7YA-CCTZ] (“While the average turtle can only
‘run’ 3 or 4 mph, there are some who are much slower.”).
69. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
70. See In re Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 958 F.2d 1144, 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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concerning the failure to respond to a rulemaking petition.71 Even if a
court finds that a delay has been unreasonable, or that at least borders
on the unreasonable, the court will likely order the agency to establish
a timetable for completion of the regulation.72 But even then, the court
may allow the agency to extend the earlier deadlines.73
III. ENHANCED ACCOUNTABILITY
The process of judicial review is the most likely to accept
deregulation by rulemaking inaction, less likely to accept the
modification of rules, and the least likely to accept the revocation of a
rule. While this asymmetry allows judges to avoid potential
interference with agency priority setting, it does so at the cost of
enabling the strategic use of rulemaking inaction as a tool of
deregulation. Accordingly, when it comes to establishing
accountability for using rulemaking inaction as deregulation,
administrative law in effect defers to electoral politics to provide that
accountability.
There are two significant problems with this judicial surrender.
First, it abandons the traditional role of administrative law in
legitimizing agency action by constraining the operation of politics
within the rulemaking process, and electoral accountability, which
exists more in theory than in practice, does not make up for this
shortfall. Second, even if the president is accountable at some broad
level for the policies of his administration, he enjoys considerable
insulation that shields him from observation by many voters when he
acts to deregulate. As a result, when a deregulatory administration
takes office, there may be no effective check on the strategic use of
rulemaking inaction as a deregulatory strategy.
Because of these defects, the courts should abandon their overly
deferential judicial review of rulemaking inaction. A less deferential

71. See, e.g., Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Union v. OSHA, 145 F.3d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1998)
(“Distilled to its essence, this petition . . . would have us intrude into the quintessential discretion
of the Secretary of Labor to allocate OSHA’s resources and set its priorities.”); Pub. Citizen
Health Research Grp. v. Brock, 823 F.2d 626, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“This court should intervene
to override agency priorities and timetables only in the most egregious of cases.”) (emphasis in
original).
72. See, e.g., In re Int’l Chem. Workers Union, 958 F.2d at 1150; Oil, Chem. & Atomic
Workers Int’l Union v. Zegeer, 768 F.2d 1480, 1488 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
73. See, e.g., Nat’l Cong. of Hispanic Am. Citizens (El Congreso) v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 882,
888 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“[T]he timetables . . . are not etched in stone . . . [and] the Secretary has
authority to delay development of a standard . . . .”).
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approach need not unduly intrude on agency priority setting, and even
if that cost cannot be entirely avoided, more aggressive review is
justified by the courts’ obligation to review political interference with
an agency’s responsibility to protect the public.
A. Legal Civics
The courts’ use of uber-deference to review rulemaking inaction
is a judicial abandonment of the traditional role of administrative law
of legitimizing agency action by constraining the operation of politics.
The origin of this obligation is the judiciary’s role in our constitutional
system of ensuring the rule of law, which in this context requires
implementing Congress’ commitment to protect the public and the
environment as an agency’s statutory mandate requires.
Administrative law has long been the way we try to fit the “‘round
peg’ of administrative government into the ‘square hole’ of the nation’s
constitutional culture.”74 Because the attributes of modern
administrative government are missing from basic constitutional
design, we have been on a decades-long effort to reinterpret our legal
culture to accommodate positive government on a massive scale.75 The
contribution of administrative law to this effort was captured by Frank
Newman’s observation that administrative law is “‘Legal’ Civics, no
more, no less.”76 At bottom, the obligation that an agency must act
consistently with its statutory mandates is what makes administrative
law into “legal” civics.
Despite the difficulty of verifying this consistency with vague and
ambiguous legislative mandates, the process of verification legitimizes
agency action by associating it with a democratic act—the enactment
of a law. It may well be the situation that Congress, by using vague and
ambiguous language, has delegated to agencies a generous policy space
in which to operate. The question is not whether the agency is carrying
out the intent of Congress, which cannot be fully determined. Rather,
it is whether the agency is acting within the confines of its delegation.
If so, judicial confirmation makes the agency action democratic, as
well.

74. Sidney A. Shapiro, Pragmatic Administrative Law, 5 ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP:
THE REFORMATION OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 1, 3 (2005).
75. For an overview of this history, see generally JAMES O. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND
LEGITIMACY: THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (1978).
76. WALTER GELLHORN & CLARK BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS
xvii (6th ed. 1974) (quoting Professor Frank C. Newman).
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On one hand, both State Farm and Massachusetts v. EPA
confirmed that administrative law is legal civics by interpreting the
relevant statutory mandates as floors of obligation to protect statutory
beneficiaries. On the other hand, the Court’s endorsement of extreme
deference in the review of agency action in Massachusetts v. EPA belies
this commitment.
When the Supreme Court reviewed NHTSA’s decision to revoke
a protective rule, it insisted that it offer “a satisfactory explanation for
its action including ‘a rational connection between the facts found and
the choice made.’”77 The Court therefore placed a floor on
deregulation by requiring that an agency be able to justify a rule
revocation as consistent with its duty to protect people or the
environment.
This is not all. The Court refused to credit that NHTSA was
fulfilling a campaign promise of President Reagan. It did not matter to
the Court that NHTSA was responding to President’ Reagan’s efforts
to bring regulatory relief to the automobile industry, one of his
prominent campaign promises.78 By requiring the agency to justify its
revocation as consistent with its statutory mandate, the Court instead
endorsed the traditional role of administrative law as a constraint on
politics.
Finally, but hardly least of all, the Court rejected the idea that
deregulatory actions are entitled to more judicial deference because
they remove government restrictions on people or property. Prior to
the State Farm decision, a range of “litigants and commentators . . .
argued that [the courts] should review deregulation less [vigorously]
than they” review the promulgation of a new rule.79 To the contrary,
according to the Court, “[i]f Congress established a presumption from
which judicial review should start, that presumption—contrary to
petitioners’ views—is not against safety regulation, but against changes
in current policy that are not justified by the rulemaking record.”80
Two aspects of Massachusetts v. EPA are noteworthy regarding
legal civics. First, the Court again explicitly rejected compliance with
presidential preferences as a justification for inaction when those
77. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)
(quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).
78. Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, From Command and Control to Collaboration and
Deference: The Transformation of Auto Safety Regulation, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 167, 188 (2017).
79. Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HARV. L. REV. 505, 513
(1985).
80. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42 (emphasis in original).
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preferences do not relate to an agency’s obligation to protect people or
the environment. And second, it refused to extend the presumption
against judicial review of enforcement decisions to agency decisions
not to regulate. This underlined that the courts must have a role in
protecting the interests of regulatory beneficiaries concerning
rulemaking inaction. Unfortunately, the Court did not recognize the
inconsistency of highly deferential review with this commitment.
The petitioners in Massachusetts v. EPA had filed a rulemaking
petition asking EPA to regulate the emission of four greenhouse gases
using its authority under the Clean Air Act.81 After EPA rejected the
petition, the Court reversed because EPA “offered no reason[ed]
explanation” of its denial.82 EPA had argued that it lacked the legal
jurisdiction for such a regulation, but the Court found no legal basis to
uphold that claim.83 As an alternative, EPA offered “a laundry list of
reasons not to regulate,” but the Court objected that EPA’s “reasons
for action or inaction must conform to the authorizing statute.”84
The Court noted that EPA claimed that if it regulated it “might
impair the President’s ability to negotiate with ‘key developing nations’
to reduce emissions,” and that regulation would “reflect ‘an inefficient,
piecemeal approach to address the climate change issue.’”85 The
problem with these reasons, the Court stated, is that “they have
nothing to do with whether greenhouse gas emissions contribute to
climate change,”86 a determination that EPA was required by statute
to make.87
By its decision, the Court was enforcing both a ceiling and a floor
that cabined EPA’s policymaking space. Just as EPA could not exceed
the legal authority delegated by Congress, it also could not avoid its
statutory obligation except for priority setting related to its mission to
protect people and the environment.
Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule argue that the Court could
not have intended the offered reading because it would prohibit an
agency from justifying the denial of a petition on resource grounds.88 It

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 510 (2007).
Id. at 534.
Id. at 528–32.
Id. at 533.
Id. (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 532–33.
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 170.
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is not evident, however, why agencies are restricted in this way.
Although Congress has tasked an agency with an affirmative obligation
to implement the protections it has identified in its mandate, surely it
also understood that agencies will have to make choices in terms of
priority setting. As Shep Melnik has noted, agencies “are almost always
given huge, even utopian, goals and are then saddled with a large
number of constraints that prevent them from achieving these goals
efficiently—or even at all.”89 Congress, for example, has ordered EPA
to “maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters,”90 to ensure waters are fishable and swimmable,91 and
to terminate discharge of pollutants.92 Only legislators willfully
ignorant of bureaucratic realities could expect that EPA could fulfill
those goals all at once as opposed to through a gradual, steady
progress.
Moreover, legitimate priority setting can be in service of that
agency mandate. As agencies have limited resources, they are likely to
be more successful in protecting people and the environment by
working on a limited number of rules than indiscriminately working on
more rules and not advancing any of them. The choice, then, inevitably
involves considering resource limitations, legal constraints, and the
agency’s political environment. The problem with rulemaking inaction
is not that agencies defend it as a matter of priority setting. The
problem is that judicial review makes little or no effort to verify that
the reasons cited by the agency are not a fig leaf for a strategy of
deregulation.
A second aspect of Massachusetts v. EPA also endorses the role of
administrative law as a constraint on politics. After Heckler v.
Chaney,93 it was unclear for a time whether the presumption against
judicial review of “enforcement” decisions created in the case included
judicial review of an agency’s decision to reject a rulemaking petition.
Although the priority setting decisions made concerning enforcement
and the rejection of a rulemaking petition require similar assessments
of agency priorities, the Court recognized that the rulemaking situation

89. R. Shep Melnick, The Political Roots of the Judicial Dilemma, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 585,
586 (1997).
90. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012).
91. Id. § 1251(a)(1).
92. Id. § 1251(a)(2).
93. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
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was different because regulatory beneficiaries have a statutory right to
protection under an agency’s mandate.
Heckler declined to review the Food and Drug Administration’s
(“FDA”) rejection of a petition from prisoners on death row asking the
agency to use its enforcement powers to stop the use of drugs for lethal
injections to carry out the death penalty.94 The plaintiffs had argued
that the FDA’s statutory mandate required it to act, but the Court
rejected their argument by calling on a presumption against judicial
review of agency enforcement actions.95
Some of the reasons the Court cited for a presumption against
review of enforcement decisions could just as easily apply to judicial
review of the rejection of a rulemaking petition. Judicial review of
enforcement priorities was “unsuitab[le]” because these decisions
“often involve[d] a complicated balancing of a number of factors which
are peculiarly within [an agency’s] expertise”96 and because a decision
not to prosecute does not involve the government’s “exercise [of] its
coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property rights.”97 The
same might be said concerning the rejection of a rulemaking petition.
The rejection, in a broad sense, is a decision about how best to
“enforce” an agency’s legislative mandate. And like a decision not to
prosecute, the rejection of a rulemaking petition does not involve the
government’s use of its coercive power.
The Court in Massachusetts v. EPA did not share this view,
however. It distinguished the two situations in this way:
In contrast to nonenforcement decisions, agency refusals to initiate
rulemaking ‘are less frequent, more apt to involve legal as opposed to
factual analysis, and subject to special formalities, including a public
explanation.’ They moreover arise out of denials of petitions for

94. Id. at 837–38.
95. Id. at 836. The Court attributed the presumption to Congress on the ground that when it
passed the Administrative Procedure Act legislators were aware of the long tradition of
prosecutorial discretion. See id. at 832 (“[W]e believe that the Congress enacting the APA did not
intend to alter that tradition” of agency discretion.).
96. Id. at 831.
97. Id. at 832 (emphasis in original). The Court also found that there was no “focus for
judicial review” because, unlike in enforcement decisions, the agency did not “exercise[] its power
in some manner.” Id. The fourth reason was that an agency’s decision not to take an enforcement
action was similar to that of a “prosecutor . . . not to indict—a decision which has long been
regarded as the special providence of the Executive Branch, inasmuch as it is the Executive who
is charged by the Constitution to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’” Id. (quoting
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
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rulemaking which (at least in the circumstances here) the affected
party had an undoubted procedural right to file in the first instance.98

Yet, the Court did not explain how these factual differences were
related to the rationale in Heckler. Put differently, why does the
balance shift in favor of judicial review in light of these differences?
It may be that the Court was saying that an agency requires more
discretion when making enforcement decisions than in decisions about
rulemaking petitions, given the differences that the Court identified.99
But the Court also mentions that these cases “arise out of denials of
petitions for rulemaking which (at least in the circumstances here) the
affected party had an undoubted procedural right to file in the first
instance.”100 In other words, Congress gave regulatory beneficiaries the
right to petition for protection, and as the Court went on to say in its
opinion, the agency has an obligation to provide that protection unless
it can give acceptable reasons why it cannot do so.101
At the same time, while it did not immunize rulemaking inaction
decisions from judicial review, the Court continued the extreme
deference that is used in rulemaking inaction cases.102 Its recognition
that enforcement and rulemaking inaction decisions involve priority
setting led it to this unfortunate compromise. Litigants can sue
regarding inaction, but agencies are entitled to extreme deference. But,
as established earlier, this review is essentially no review at all.103 Thus,
by default, the Court left regulatory beneficiaries with political
accountability as the sole protection of their interests. This is, as it turns
out, little to no protection in administrations that use rulemaking
inaction as a deregulatory strategy.
Some readers might object that inaction is not really a
deregulatory strategy because, after all, there is no revocation or
modification of an existing regulation. Once you consider that
Congress establishes both a floor and ceiling when it adopts a
regulatory mandate, however, inaction is properly considered
deregulation. Congress has obligated an agency to act to protect the
98. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527 (2007) (citations omitted).
99. See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to
Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51, 96–97 (2007) (suggesting that the differences were related to
“worry that agencies must have discretion to allocate resources on cost-benefit grounds”).
100. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. at 527.
101. See id. at 534 (finding that EPA “offered no reasoned explanation” for its rejection).
102. Id. at 527–28.
103. See supra Part II.C (discussing the very deferential review applied by courts in the rare
instances that plaintiffs are entitled to relief).
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public. It has not been indifferent between regulating and not
regulating. When an agency fails to regulate, it is defying its legislative
mandate, and that act is properly considered deregulatory unless the
agency can establish that it has higher priorities in terms of protecting
people and the environment.
B. “The Unbearable Lightness”104 of Political Accountability
State Farm and Massachusetts v. EPA create an expectation that
an agency’s refusal to regulate must be defended as consistent with its
statutory mandate. Whatever has motivated an agency, including
presidential preferences, the agency must justify its actions as
consistent with its statutory mandate. Priority setting is a legitimate
aspect of that mandate. Although agencies have an obligation to
protect regulatory beneficiaries, that mandate is facilitated when
agencies make reasonable choices as to how best to implement it.
The challenge for the courts concerning rulemaking inaction is
how to verify that an agency has made reasonable choices concerning
priority setting. Under the current approach, the courts make no
serious effort to determine whether agencies’ claims about priority
setting are reasonable. The court’s use of uber-deference takes them
entirely out of the picture as an agent of accountability.
This defection results in a default to presidential accountability to
protect regulatory beneficiaries. For some scholars, this defection is
appropriate. They contend an agency should be able to rely on
presidential preferences as part of its justification for an action.105
According to this argument, because the president is accountable to
the electorate, the legitimacy of administrative law is thus
strengthened, not weakened.106 In addition, they justify judicial

104. With a nod to MILAN KUNDERA, THE UNBEARABLE LIGHTNESS OF BEING (1984).
105. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL
CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 192 (1990) (contending that courts should “credit politics as an
acceptable and even desirable element of decision making”); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a
Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2009) (proposing that
courts should accept certain “political influences” in favor of a rule’s validity so long as they “are
openly and transparently disclosed in the agency’s rulemaking record”). See generally Nina A.
Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127
(2010) (documenting presidential supervision of agencies and resulting changes in agency rules
while arguing for greater transparency of this influence).
106. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2380 (2001)
(proposing that courts relax hard look review if “demonstrable evidence shows that the President
has taken an active role in, and by so doing has accepted responsibility for, [an] administrative
decision”).
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recognition of presidential preferences as consistent with
constitutional arrangements that put the president is charge of the
federal government.107
Other scholars object that this move would weaken the traditional
role of administrative law in legitimizing agency regulatory action.
Specifically, their animating concern is that it would result in
constraining the operation of politics within the rulemaking process.108
They also doubt the efficacy of presidential accountability to prevent
the president from doing the bidding of special interest groups in
supervising agency action.109
Concerns about presidential accountability are well founded for
three reasons. First, as the political science literature warns us, the
actions of elected officials are often hidden from voters, a condition
that is described as “slack.”110 When elected officials have slack, this
invisibility allows them to avoid electoral control by voters and do the
bidding of special interest groups to the detriment of their
constituents.111 Unsurprisingly, “the president has the incentive and

107. The unitary executive “allocates the power of law execution and administration to the
President alone.” Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute
the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 549 (1994). As result, even if Congress has expressly delegated
rulemaking authority to an agency, the president can decide issues regarding the timing or
substance of rulemaking. See id. at 581–82.
108. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, The Irrelevance of Politics for Arbitrary and Capricious
Review, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 141, 144–45 (2012) (taking the position that “although politics may
be a legitimate motivation for agency regulation, it should be irrelevant to judicial review of that
regulation”). See generally Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative Law:
Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811 (2012) (rejecting political reason-giving
models for reform).
109. See Glen Staszewski, Political Reasons, Deliberative Democracy, and Administrative
Law, 97 IOWA L. REV. 849, 852, 898–99 (2012) (objecting to the courts giving positive weight to
political reasons in arbitrary and capricious review because it undermines electoral
accountability).
110. Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the
Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 167, 185 (1990) (defining “slack”). The
authors explain:
High information, monitoring and organization costs create “slack,” which shields
officials from accountability to the general polity. Members of the general polity
ordinarily do not have an incentive to learn issues well enough to comprehend their
impact or to monitor and discipline the behavior of all those officials whose acts might
affect them. This slack can be used by a regulator or her political sponsor to pursue
officeholding self-interest . . . by pursuing regulatory policies that benefit special
interests.
Id.
111. Id. at 176–77; Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic
Theory of Politics, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 279, 282–84 (1984) (observing that any “slack” given to
political representatives can result in behavior that is independent of their constituents’
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ability to hide” actions taken at the behest of special interest groups.112
But, even if voters have some idea about the president’s tactics, it
seems farfetched that many would understand the strategic use of
rulemaking inaction as a tool of deregulation, and in particular, how
inaction can delay the adoption of protective rules for years and
years.113
Second, even if voters cop on to a president’s tactics, they will have
to wait until the next election to correct a president’s commitment to
inaction, which can postpone protective actions by five or more
additional years even after a pro-protective president is elected.114 In a
president’s second term, electoral accountability is even more
attenuated, making it, to the extent it does exist, a weak protection of
the interests of regulatory beneficiaries. It is well established that
Americans can pay a high price for that delay, both in dollars and lost
lives.115
Finally, it is not clear that voters will be able to hold a president
accountable in light of dysfunction in the political system, such as the
electoral college, campaign finance laws that permit unlimited
contributions by the wealthy, political gerrymandering, and voter
irrationality which can give the upper hand to interests opposed to
government regulation. Because of the electoral college, a nominee can

accountability).
112. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 78 NYU L. REV. 461, 506 (2003).
113. It is true that if a president campaigns on promising less regulation, voters will have this
information, but voters’ capacity to understand and process the information is likely to be limited
as explained above.
114. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., CATHERINE O’NEILL, AMY SINDEN, RENA STEINZOR, JAMES GOODWIN &
LING-YEE HUANG ET AL., THE HIDDEN HUMAN AND ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF
REGULATORY DELAY 1 (2009), http://www.progressivereform.org/articles/CostofDelay_907.pdf
[http://perma.cc/8ZNT-GRGT] (discussing how “[e]ach year dozens of workers are killed,
thousands of children harmed, and millions of dollars wasted because of unjustifiable delays in
federal regulatory action.”); Ariel Katz, Pharmaceutical Lemons: Innovation and Regulation in
the Drug Industry, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007) (finding that “as a result of
the cost and delay imposed by the regulatory approval process, thousands of potential new drug
beneficiaries would die or unnecessarily suffer”); Ruth Ruttenberg, Jonathan Cardi & Estye
Fenton, The Taxpayers’ Burden from Product-Related Harm, 21 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 121, 121
(2011) (noting that “[h]undreds of billions of dollars are spent every year in the public sector as a
result of death, injury, and illness associated with products”); Sidney Shapiro, Ruth Ruttenberg
& Paul Leigh, The Social Costs of Dangerous Products: An Empirical Investigation, 18 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 775 (2009) (calculating empirical estimates of the costs to consumers of product
and other injuries that are not prevented).
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win the presidency and still lose the popular vote,116 an anomaly that
can prevent the majority of Americans from holding a president
accountable for the president’s deregulatory policies.117 After Citizens
United,118 the capacity of wealthier Americans and corporations to
spend unlimited amounts of money to support a president committed
to deregulation increases their influence over the political process.119
Political gerrymandering can distort the election of members of
Congress, allowing the party of a deregulatory president to control the
House of Representatives despite losing the national vote for members
of the House.120 Finally, the opponents of a president who engages in
deregulation must overcome the irrationality of voters that can lead
116. President George W. Bush, for example, was elected president by the Electoral College
on a vote of 271 to 266 although his opponent, Al Gore, won 51 percent of the popular vote. 2000
Presidential Electoral and Popular Vote, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION (Dec., 2001),
https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2000/elecpop.htm
[https://perma.cc/27ZY-ZH3Q].
More
recently, President Donald Trump received 304 votes to Hillary Clinton’s 227 votes in the
electoral college, FED. ELECTION COMMISSION, OFFICIAL 2016 GENERAL ELECTION VOTES 1
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2016/2016presgeresults.pdf [https://perma.cc/
SYX2-CPWK], although Clinton received almost three million more votes in the popular
election. Id. at 2, 6; Presidential Election Results: Donald J. Trump Wins, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9,
2017, 9:00 AM ET), https://www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president [https://perma.cc/
RM5C-EQK8.
117. See Akhil Reed Amar, A Constitutional Accident Waiting to Happen, 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 143, 143, 145 (1995) (noting that “dreaded specter of a clear popular loser becoming
the electoral college winner” is a “constitutional accident waiting to happen”); John B. Anderson,
The Electoral College Flunks the Test in an Age of Democracy, AM. B. ASS’N: HUM. RTS. MAG.
(June
30,
2017),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_rights_
magazine_home/human_rights_vol32_2005/spring2005/hr_spring05_college [https://perma.cc/
KR8P-GCJN] (calling for “[d]irect democracy . . . at home within the borders of the American
republic”).
118. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
119. See Tim Bakken, Constitutional Rights and Political Power of Corporations After Citizens
United: The Decline of Citizens and the Rise of Foreign Corporations and Super PACs, 12
CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS 119, 120 (2013) (concluding that “Citizens United creates
immense additional corporate influence over the U.S. political process”); Robert Weissman,
Commentary, Let the People Speak: The Case for a Constitutional Amendment to Remove
Corporate Speech From the Ambit of the First Amendment, 83 TEMPLE L. REV. 979, 995 (2011)
(observing, based on empirical information, that Citizens United “empowered a tiny number of
organizations, relying on a tiny number of corporate and superwealthy contributors—many
hidden behind a veil of secrecy—to raise and spend huge sums of money and exert a very
substantial impact on the campaigns”).
120. See Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 77, 112 (1985) (finding the invidious discrimination “against the candidates of a political
party is to effectively disenfranchise the voters who support the positions espoused by that party’s
candidates, to dilute the importance of their views in the halls of the legislature”); Richard E.
Levy, The Nonpartisanship Principle, 25 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 377, 392–93 (2016)
(demonstrating how, as a result of gerrymandering, the Republican party can win more seats in
the House of Representatives despite winning less than 50 percent of the national vote).
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them to favor polices like deregulation even though the voters are
disadvantaged by the policy.121 Not for nothing did Winston Churchill
observe “it has been said that democracy is the worst form of
Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from
time to time . . . .”122
Realistic appraisal of electoral accountability leads to the
conclusion that presidents can use deregulation to reward regulated
entities and their supporters for their political support, despite the fact
that the president is elected by and represents the entire nation. As
Lisa Schultz Bressman has pointed out, “[a]sserting that the President
is more immune to factional pressure than Congress because of his
national constituency only asserts that [he] is immune in a relative
sense” and “serious questions exist as to whether the President is
immune at all.”123
To be fair, scholars who would allow agencies to defend their
actions based on presidential preferences are not completely trusting
of electoral accountability. Katheryn Watts, for example, has proposed
that courts should be more inclined to defer to an agency policy choice
where the agency’s reasons for that choice include “the president
wanted us to do this.”124 At the same time, she would have courts reject
agency reasons that reflect “raw politics or partisan politics.”125
As noted, administrative law has not chosen this path.126 Agencies
can consider presidential preferences, but they still must “come up with
reasoned justifications that can theoretically stand on their own
regardless of which political actors might favor them.”127 This
traditional administrative limitation on politics respects the idea that

121. See Sherman J. Clark, Commentary, A Populist Critique of Direct Democracy, 112
HARV. L. REV. 434, 476 (1998) (observing the “[p]otentially troubling . . . near-certainty that there
are many issues voters do not understand well, or perhaps do not even realize are being decided”);
Gary M. Lucas, Jr. & Slavisa Tasic, Behaviroal Public Choice and the Law, 118 W. VA. L. REV.
199, 212 (2015) (noting that “irrationality opens up an opportunity for politicians, bureaucrats,
and special interest groups to take advantage of voters” because “[i]rrational voters may not
rationally discount propaganda and other appeals to emotion, making them susceptible to
deceptive forms of persuasion”).
122. The Worst Form of Government, INT’L CHURCHILL SOC’Y, https://winstonchurchill.org/
resources/quotes/the-worst-form-of-government [https://perma.cc/V35F-U8FT].
123. Bressman, supra note 112, at 504.
124. Watts, supra note 105, at 8–9.
125. Id. at 9.
126. See supra Part III.A (describing the courts’ focus on agencies’ compliance with their
regulatory mandate while declining to credit political factors).
127. Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 66, at 1474.
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the president, as much as an agency, is bound by the law—an agency’s
statutory mandate. And it still permits agencies to follow presidential
preferences, but they must establish that they are acting consistent with
an agency’s mandate to protect the public or the environment.
Sunstein and Vermeule have also proposed that the courts
consider presidential preferences. But their proposal would allow the
courts to take into consideration presidential preferences unrelated to
an agency’s statutory mandate in certain circumstances.128 Under their
proposed “anti-circumvention principle,” an agency could not reject a
rulemaking petition if it would circumvent express or implied
congressional instructions by deferring agency action.129 This limitation
is necessary, they contend, to prevent “decisions not to decide, or to
defer decisions” from becoming “a license for agencies to circumvent
policy choices that Congress was entitled to make and did make, solely
on the invalid ground that the agency disagrees with those policy
choices.”130 If, however, Congress has issued no such instructions,
Sunstein and Vermeule would continue the uber-deference that the
courts use in reviewing an agency’s justifications for rulemaking
inaction,131 and they would accept reasons that do not relate to the
agency’s statutory mandate, which would include presidential
preferences.132
My objection to these proposals is that they constitute a
fundamental break from the role of administrative law in constraining
politics. Specifically, it permits the courts to defer to presidential
preferences unrelated to an agency’s mandate as long as such
preferences do not circumvent express or implied congressional
instructions. Watts, Sunstein, and Vermeule want the courts to
legitimate agency activity in part if it has a presidential endorsement.
Sunstein and Vermeule are prepared to accept such reasons because
“the President is highly accountable.”133 For the reasons identified
earlier,134 one can dispute the claim that the President is “highly
accountable.”

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 6, at 161–62.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 182–83.
Id. at 162.
Id. at 161.
See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 109–122 and accompanying text.
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Watts is less trusting and would ban citing administration
preferences if they constitute raw or partisan politics. But it is not clear
how a court would make that determination in the context of
rulemaking inaction where there is a limited record and litigants who
challenge inaction are handicapped by that limitation.
More fundamentally, the trio has untethered administrative law
from the principle that the president must act consistently with an
agency’s mandate unless Congress establishes that obligation in an
express or implied manner. This leaves presidential compliance with
agency mandates to the judgment of judges, centering upon whether
Congress has “explicitly or impliedly” limited the president’s freedom
of action and weakens the protection of administrative law as a
guarantor of the rule of law.
Sunstein and Vermeule might respond that, if Congress has not at
least impliedly limited agency compliance with presidential
preferences that do not relate to an agency’s statutory mandate, the
rule of law is not challenged. Congress has left it up to the agency and
the president when to engage in rulemaking inaction. But this response
ignores the overall thrust of the legislation to protect regulatory
beneficiaries. When Congress passes a law protecting people or the
environment, it is not accurate to read that law as saying you can dump
this protection in favor of some other presidential priority—say foreign
policy—if you would like to do so. The law itself is an explicit rejection
of that premise.
Different people will reach different conclusions concerning the
appropriate balance between politics and policy in rulemaking based
on their experiences and expectations. My goal is to protect the
interests of statutory beneficiaries in the context of rulemaking
inaction. Along with Judge Skelly Wright, I am concerned that
“important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress, are
not lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the federal
bureaucracy.”135 Administrative law does this best when it requires
agencies to defend their choices as consistent with their statutory
mission without regard to presidential preferences that are, for the
most part, unaccountable to the electorate or unaccountable in time to
protect the interests of regulatory beneficiaries.

135. Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109,
1111 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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C. Less Passive Judicial Review
If administrative law is to be legal civics, judges will have to
employ a less deferential form of review than the toothless scope of
review now used for rulemaking inaction. Instead of “extremely
limited” and “highly deferential” review,136 the courts should expect
agencies to offer an adequate explanation for the rejection of a petition
or a delay in responding to a petition. The scope of review, in other
words, should be just the same as when an agency adopts a rule,
prompting a judge to take a hard look at the agency’s explanation.137
What constitutes an adequate explanation, however, would be adjusted
in light of the lack of a rulemaking record and the necessity of agency
priority setting.
How a judge employs hard look review would necessarily have to
change. When a judge reviews a rulemaking record, he or she he can
compare the agency’s justification for its actions with the record it has
compiled. As there is no similar record in inaction cases, hard look
review needs to be adapted. Although a judge cannot dive into a
record, she or he can expect an agency to offer more than a perfunctory
defense of its inaction and to back up its claims about priorities with an
explanation that is “adequate” to back up these claims.
If, for example, the agency claims a lack of resources, judges
should expect budget details about the agency’s inability to work on
more rulemaking projects. If the agency claims that it has higher
priorities, the judge should expect the agency to explain why the other
rules being drafted are more likely to fulfill its statutory mandate.
At the same time, judges should be reluctant to accept an
explanation for inaction that posits an agency is too busy deregulating
to take up regulatory proposals. An important aspect of this mood
change is the recognition that agencies have an obligation to engage in
regulation as defined by their statutory mandate. Judges should
therefore be skeptical if an agency defends rulemaking inaction on the
grounds it is too busy deregulating to work on new protections. That
reason should be unacceptable because it is not one that is within the
ambit of the agency’s legislative mandate.

136. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527–28 (2007) (quoting Nat’l Customs Brokers &
Forwarders Ass’n. of Am. v. United States, 883 F.2d 93, 96 (D.C. Cir. 1989)).
137. DANIEL A. FARBER, LISA HEINZERLING & PETER M. SHANE, REFORMING
“REGULATORY REFORM”: A PROGRESSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR AGENCY RULEMAKING IN THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 13 (Oct. 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/Oct-2018APA-Farber-Heinzerling-Shane-issue-brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FPW-HB7U].
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That said, this does not mean that an agency should not be able to
engage in a mix of activities including rule revocation, modification,
and inaction as well as protective regulations. But the agency does need
to offer a justification that its particular overall approach is consistent
with its statutory mandate.
This new mood also does not preclude an agency from choosing to
work on some rules rather than others based on legal and political
factors. Once again, however, the agency is obligated to defend its mix
as furthering its statutory mission to protect the public or the
environment. Avoiding problematic rules and working instead on
more feasible rules serves that mission.
I have a hesitation, however, about Sharon Jacobs’s proposal
allowing agencies to accept, as a justification for rulemaking inaction,
that the judicial or political environment is unfavorable.138 As said,
when an agency lives to fight another day, it may better its chances to
engage in the type of protections that Congress mandated in its
statute.139 In a deregulatory administration, however, such a “practical
consideration” may permit an agency to go years without any forward
motion toward protecting regulatory beneficiaries.140 It is one thing to
choose protective rules that have a better chance of being implemented
for legal and political reasons, but it is another to stop work on
protective rules because the president is not committed to protecting
regulatory beneficiaries. At bottom, this justification violates the
agency’s statutory mandate to protect the public.
The aim is to change the “mood” of judicial review.141 Use of hard
look review, instead of soft look review, recognizes the judiciary’s
responsibility to ensure that an agency action and inaction are both
within the agency’s statutory delegation; both types of “action” require
the same level of judicial scrutiny. The redefinition of the scope of
review would signal that regulatory beneficiaries are no longer secondclass citizens when it comes to ensuring the rule of law, but instead are
entitled to the same scope of review as regulated entities. Whether a
court is reviewing action or inaction, the question is the same: Is the

138. See Sharon B. Jacobs, The Administrative State’s Passive Virtues, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 565,
616 (2014) (asserting that agencies should be able to avoid political and legal entanglements).
139. Id. at 606.
140. See id. (proposing that courts recognize political and legal impediments as practical
constraints).
141. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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agency operating within the legal space as specified by its legislative
mandate?
Skeptics will object that judges are likely to do more harm than
good once they engage in more searching review of the reasons that
agencies offer for rulemaking inaction. The idea is that courts will be
able to avoid blundering in light of the complexity involved in priority
setting and the multiple factors that an agency considers. The courts,
however, can employ judicial remands to require a more adequate
justification if an agency falls short, which protects judges from rushing
in to readjust an agency’s priorities.142 My proposal does expect
agencies to be able to explain their inaction decisions with persuasive
details, but it allows judges to accept those explanations once they are
forthcoming.
It is also possible that a change in the definition of the scope of
review would make no difference. Once agencies furnished some
additional information, judges would then continue to defer to agency
explanations for the same reasons they now employ uber-deference—
not wanting to interfere with agency priority setting and the lack of a
record that could be used to check the validity of the agency’s reasons.
Judges, however, may not be so inclined once agencies have a
judicially enforced obligation to offer an “adequate” explanation for
inaction, one that consists of more than a rudimentary recitation of a
lack of resources and higher priorities. The requirement of adequate
reasons will remind judges that Congress has established both a floor
and a ceiling when it passes regulatory legislation, and the failure to be
more inquisitive regarding inaction constitutes a judicial failure to
enforce the floor. At the moment, by comparison, the idea of a
legislative floor is invisible to judges. The assumption appears to be
that Congress has delegated priority setting to agencies, and courts
honor this request by using uber-deference. In short, once the
framework of review is changed, the results are more likely to change
as well.
Moreover, once judges ask agencies for more specific information
as to why they are rejecting a rulemaking petition, there is more
opportunity for petitioners to challenge the decision than under the
current judicial genuflection to agency justifications that waive the flag
of resources and not much more.

142. Garland, supra note 79, at 565.
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There are two additional advantages to my proposal. First, more
skeptical judicial review can incentivize agencies to create a priority
setting process or improve an existing process, something that agencies
always do or keep up to date.143 It can also force agencies to offer
concrete information to back up assertions about agency priorities
more quickly and efficiently. More generally, a priority setting process
is a key element of effective implementation of an agency’s statutory
mandate when it identifies the best ways to achieve an agency’s
statutory mandate to protect people and the environment. In short, it
is good governance.
Second, the public will gain more information about agency
priorities and resources when judges expect agencies to offer more
detailed explanations for a lack of action. In this sense, an “explained”
delay is better than an “unexplained” delay.144 In particular, agency
explanations based on a lack of resources may signal to Congress that
agencies lack sufficient funding to implement more worthwhile rules to
protect people and the environment. As I have discussed elsewhere,
there is a lack of information regarding what additional protections an
agency could adopt if it had additional resources.145
It is also possible that soft look review will divert an agency from
working on current projects because of the obligation to offer a more
adequate explanation or to respond to a judicial remand to do so.146 As
stated, an agency can reduce the resources it expends on defending
inaction in court by establishing and using a priority setting process.
But, even if there is some loss of agency efficiency, it is a price worth
paying because of the advantages of soft review identified in the
previous paragraphs.
Despite these improvements, there is a practical limit to the extent
to which judges will be able to ferret out the strategic use of inaction as
a deregulatory tool. Although judicial review will be less deferential, it
will still be deferential. And it should be. Judges will still be
handicapped by the lack of a record against which they can test the
claims made by the agency regarding inaction. To adopt a cliché,
143. See MCGARITY & SHAPIRO, supra note 2, at 187–88 (noting that OSHA, for example,
“has no way to choose among the many projects that are putatively on its agenda”).
144. Shapiro & Murphy, supra note 66, at 1496.
145. See STEINZOR & SHAPIRO, supra note 65, at 69, 227 (explaining that Congress lacks
information about how much money agencies need to implement their statutory mission).
146. See Jacobs, supra note 138, at 613 (objecting to expanding reason-giving for inaction on
the grounds that it would take more agency resources and therefore significantly exacerbate an
agency’s lack of resources).
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however, we should not let perfect be the enemy of the good. The
courts can do a better job of policing inaction, and they should do so.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Trump administration may be the first presidency to go four
years without promulgating new significant regulations to protect
people and the environment. But the use of rulemaking inaction as a
deregulatory strategy has been employed in previous administrations
hostile to government regulation. Although administrative law
protects regulatory beneficiaries when agencies revoke or modify
previous rules, those protections evaporate when an agency rejects a
rulemaking petition, fails to answer a petition for years, or fails to work
on pending regulatory protections.
This state of affairs arises because the courts have been reluctant
to second-guess agency inaction based on agency priority setting, and
reasonably so because of the difficulty of judging whether an agency
has struck the proper balance among the multiple factors that go into
priority setting. In effect, the courts have outsourced agency
accountability for rulemaking inaction to political oversight.
As a defense of the interests of regulatory beneficiaries, political
accountability is the “Maginot Line” of oversight. And even if voters
would somehow replace a president who ignores their interests, that
president will still have delayed protections for up to eight or more
years, given how long it would take an administration interested in
protection to promulgate new significant rules.
Despite the difficulty of judging an agency’s claim that it has
higher priorities or that it needs more time to make a decision, the
courts can still do better. Administrative law constrains politics by
requiring agencies to justify their actions as consistent with their
legislative mandates. Instead of merely accepting agency claims about
priorities, the courts should demand more detailed explanations. If
explanations fall short, remands to allow the agency another chance to
explain would be in order. Although not a cure for administration
obstructionism, judicial review would no longer be a parchment
barrier.
Raising judicial expectations about what constitutes an adequate
explanation for rulemaking inaction, even if it has only modest impact,
aligns this area of the law with the role of administrative law in setting
a floor and ceiling on agency policymaking. Just as an agency cannot
exceed its statutory authority, it should not be able to avoid it either by
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inaction. If administrative law is to legitimize agency action, the courts
must enforce, as best they can, an agency’s obligation to protect people
or the environment.

